With the recent rumours about Frizell potentially returning to NZ and the persistent questions surrounding the AB blindside position, I thought it would be interesting to take another look at the past, present and future of the 6-jersey. Specifically, I’m interested in the selection policies and thought processes, why exactly it’s been so hard for the selectors to find a suitable, long-term replacement for Jerome Kaino, and how current candidates in 2025 would fare in the face of historical selection patterns and requirements. In the end, it boils down to the perennial question: what is a blindside, really? There’s a lot to unpack, as you’d expect. Apologies in advance for the rather lengthy post. The past: a Kaino-sized hole 8 July 2017. This was the last Test start for Jerome Kaino in the #6 jersey, against the British and Irish Lions at Eden Park. Since that time, 12 players have worn the jersey across 95 tests over 7 years, with varying degrees of success and duration. This is the list of all the Tests played, the starting 6, opponent, and result. When looking more specifically at some of the cumulative numbers of the different players – number of starts, starting streaks, and win percentages – we get the following table. I’ve highlighted a few things, Frizell, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been the most consistent name on the team sheet, making 26 starting appearances between 2018 and ’23 as the starting six. Behind him figures Akira Ioane, with 15 starts. Ioane had a somewhat consistent spell in the jersey from 2020 onwards, only to be unceremoniously dumped ahead of the 2023 Test season. Neither of these two players were ever obvious first-choice selections, with both only ever stringing together 5 consecutive starts. And while rotation is normal – Kaino’s longest starting streak was 9 consecutive Tests across 2 seasons, starting during the 2015 Rugby World Cup and finishing after the 2nd 2016 Test against Wales – both players often lost their place against top tier opposition, something which was much rarer for Kaino from the 2009 season onwards. So the selectors never really settled on a single player, the closest being Frizell during the 2023 Test season, where the selectors seemingly finally backed the Tongan flanker as their main man. It certainly didn’t help that the post-Kaino heir apparent, Liam Squire, was unable to put together a consistent streak of performances due to a number of factors, only ever starting 3 Tests consecutively as the AB blindside. And while someone like Vaea Fifita had some intriguing performances around this period, the fact that Fifita was the 2nd-choice behind Squire, despite being such a different type of player, already anticipates some of the muddled thinking of then-AB selectors on what they actually wanted from their six. So what could’ve been some of the factors in this inability to produce consistent blindside appearances? Selection policy is certainly partly to blame: players were put into the jersey without seemingly any sort of preconceived or long-term plan in mind. An example of this is someone like Dalton Papali’i being tested out in the position during a crucial Test against Ireland in Dunedin during the 2022 Test series. When the results don’t go as planned, however, the player isn’t seen in the jersey again. So why was he put there in the first place? Perhaps the best example of this is the appearances of players in the 6-jersey during crucial World Cup matches who didn’t have any experience of playing there – Barrett against England in the 2019 semi-final, and Vaa’i against France during the 2023 group stages. There seemed to be a too strong belief in the power of tactical surprise and not enough belief in the power of future-proofing from both Hansen and Foster. Faced with obsessive planners during the World Cup – Eddie Jones with England in 2019, Fabien Galthié with France in 2023 – their response seemed to consist solely of the selectorial equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. Particularly clever, it ain’t. Why is it so hard for the ABs to find the right six? Another factor surely is not so much the timing of the selections, but the selected player profiles themselves. The first two blindsides selected after Kaino are a good example of this, Squire and Fifita: one is a hard-nosed flanker who excels in the close quarter collisions; the other is at his best out wide, playing and accelerating into space. Fifita’s own interpretation of the blindside’s role – “I like six, because I can use my athleticism to do what I can do on the outside, rather just stay tight and do the hard work, like running into a brick wall and getting your body tired” – is telling in its own right. Squire, on the other hand, had a very different view on the requirements of the jersey. Speaking on James Marshall’s What A Lad-podcast, he commented: “I just wanted to run into it as hard as I could... I sort of knew if I could hit someone as hard as I possibly can each time, then I’d most likely win the contact.” It’s hard to imagine more contrasting mindsets as those of Squire and Fifita. So why were both selected then? My own guess is that the AB selection criteria for the jersey suffer from a kind of schizophrenia, where the selectors really want two playing profiles for the price of one: on the one hand, they want the player to comply to the Test requirements of a proper blindside – someone who is a physical presence, dominates the collisions, while bringing a more dynamic element to core tight five roles such as cleaning and carrying up the middle. This Test blindside has size, grunt and mongrel, which needs to be used to stop mauls, bring carriers down quickly and to smash breakdowns. This, however, isn’t enough for the voracious demands of the AB selectors, adding on game-specific requirements unique to their own game plans: their blindside needs to do all of the above, while also being comfortable as an edge forward, someone who has an offloading game, attacking vision as well as a genuine athletic edge. It’s not hard to imagine the AB selectors looking at Pieter-Steph Du Toit and telling him to work on his handling and attacking support play. If this sounds like an unreasonable and overly long list of demands, then you’d be right. To me, one of the foundational reasons for the AB blindside-conundrum is, in other words, self-inflicted, with the requirements of the player simply being too demanding. What is described here are two players, not one. This becomes further obvious if we were to re-classify the previous blindside-suitors into two groups, those of tight and loose blindsides. It is important to mention now that this distinction isn’t in any shape or form meant to be normative, meaning that one style is by definition better than the other. Both styles are requirements, not options, within the AB game plan. My classification here is mostly based on what I consider to be the respective player’s foremost strength, the style which fits closest to what the player themselves consider to be their bread and butter. Furthermore, I’m also not claiming that these players aren’t able to thrive playing those other styles. Dalton Papali’i has fantastic abilities on the edge, while Ioane can be destructive in the tight. My argument is more that these players, like almost every other player, excel in a particular part and space of the game, be it in the tight or the loose. The AB selectors, however, have made no decision on what kind of style they want their blindside to focus on. The six needs to be able to do everything, almost equally well, in their view. This is where the problems start. The present: decisions, decisions So what does this mean for the present and the upcoming selection of potential AB blindsides? If we were to separate these two styles, as we did above, then the New Zealand rugby landscape offers plenty of potential candidates: This isn’t meant as an exhaustive table of potential blindside-candidates, more a selection of players who clearly fit one of these two specific playing styles. Others who are more difficult to categorize, like Jacobson, an undersized tight six candidate, I’ve left out for now. The distinction is pretty clear: the players on the left are typically lock/6s, while the players on the right are equally comfortable at 6 and 8. The players on the left are proficient in the lineout, have high tackle numbers and prefer to spend most of their time in the middle of the field. The players on the right have a more developed attacking identity, able to play in space on the edge, have an offloading game and, importantly, possess rapid acceleration. All of these players can play blindside at Test level. But they are considerably different in their focus, style and areas of specialization. The issues start when tight sixes are being asked to do loose six-roles, and vice versa, something which already acts as a predictor of potential issues at Test level within the AB game plan. Take the Round 10 clash between the Chiefs and the Highlanders, for example, which puts a tight six like Oliver Haig opposite a more loose six like Samipeni Finau. Very quickly, the differences between the two become apparent due to the distinctive nature of each of the two halves. In the first half, the match was stop-start, a continuous struggle between the two forward packs for territory and possession. The ball went from set-piece to set-piece, from kick to kick, with most of the rugby being played between the 22s as a contest for the ball. This kind of style suits a player like Haig, who likes to play in a supporting role, whether it be in the tackle, carry or clean, alongside the tight forwards. Playing tight: Haig likes to stay close to his tight forwards, contesting for possession in the middle of the field Haig could most often be found in or around the ruck in defence, typically in partnership with either Holland or Lasaqa While Haig seemed to enjoy this contest- and forward-focused first half, a player like Finau thrives in the open spaces with the ball in his hand. When the ball barely reaches the edge, however, due to the nature of the breakdown contest in the middle of the field, Finau finds it more difficult to involve himself in the game. Finau, away from the ball, calling for the ball to come his way but the movement doesn’t reach the end of the chain Instead of getting caught up in the forward tussle in the middle of the field, Finau keeps his width, waiting for the ball to eventually come his way. While this width stresses the defence somewhat, it leaves the Chiefs tight five with fewer bodies to contest the breakdown battle. Again, it’s not as if Finau doesn’t or isn’t able to effectively clean, with this dynamic clean on Renton preventing a certain turnover. Finau clean But it’s less of a central facet to his game than it is to Haig: if Brown doesn’t slip, Finau probably continues moving out wide to take up an attacking position rather than execute a dominant clean alongside the Chiefs openside flanker. In contrast to Haig, Finau doesn’t continuously work in pairs, like Jacobson, Brown, Vaa’i and Ah Kuoi do for the Chiefs. If Haig felt at ease during the first half forward slog, with Finau struggling to get into the game, the roles would completely reverse in the second, with the game suddenly breaking open for the attack. With Finau, you get a player who is incredibly comfortable in open space, who is able to see attacking opportunities unfold before they’ve happened. He also possesses a skillset which is invaluable in unlocking certain attacking movements on the fly. For the Chiefs’ first score after the break, Finau first runs a great, self-spotted line from the lineout, while then calling himself as the spontaneous backdoor passer in the following phase, when the ball shifts back to the open. Here, Finau is at his best, acting as a crucial link player between forwards and backs. Ten minutes later, Finau’s persistence on the edge would be rewarded when McKenzie finds him with a well-executed cross-kick. Finau try The contrast in attacking sensibilities between Haig and Finau is strong. While the latter is like a fish in water in attacking spaces, the former looks more like a deer in headlights. In a rare moment when the ball came to him in attack on the edges, Haig struggled to move away from his natural tendency to play a supporting role and keep his width. Early in the first half, for example, with the ball moving out wide with the Highlanders on attack, Haig needed to drift on his opposite, creating space for his inside man while providing the latter with a legitimate passing target. Instead, Haig’s tight instincts immediately kick in, looking to position himself on his inside man’s shoulder as a support and cleaning option. Closing the space But the unintended effect is that the space becomes shut down as well as the attack, with the Highlanders being saved from being turned over courtesy of an earlier penalty advantage. During the second half, with the game breaking up a bit more, Finau started to thrive while Haig struggled to find his feet out wide, the latter being hooked relatively quickly in the half with TK Howden coming on. Both Finau and Haig’s issue, in other words, is that they struggle to switch up how they play, making them relatively dependent on the in-game context for them to be effective rather than being able to impact the game no matter the type of contest. And this is where the blindside’s role becomes important. As the player who connects the tight five with the loose forwards, the blindside is a player who needs to be able to take on a multitude of roles and styles: sometimes playing creatively on the attacking edge, and sometimes playing in close support, being closely bound with the tight forwards in collective play. More than anything, it’s what the ABs seemingly demand from the position, as someone who can play in the right style, at the right time. This is, however, far easier said than done, and Finau’s and Haig’s contrasting skillsets show why. While both have their own unique strengths, playing as the AB 6, they will be expected to be equally proficient in both the loose and the tight. But when this isn’t a skillset which comes particularly naturally to those players, they are on a hiding to nothing. We have seen how players, when faced with the difficult demands of Test rugby and Test coaches, start playing outside of their natural game. It’s easy to imagine how both players would look to overcompensate their own perceived weaknesses in the Test arena – Finau starting to play tighter and more conservative, Haig looking to force himself to stay wide on attack – to detrimental effect. Someone like Taniela Tupou is on record as saying how he’s starting to feel like he doesn’t know how to play rugby anymore, after constantly being told to change certain parts of his game. A similar difficulty potentially awaits AB blindsides, as long as the selectors have such ambitious demands of their number six. Future: the key(s) to the blindside position So what is a blindside, really? From an AB perspective, more than a lineout option, a physical presence, an edge forward, or a collision specialist, the ideal blindside is essentially someone who is equally proficient in tight and loose responsibilities. And, perhaps even more importantly, is someone who has mastered the art of knowing when to play tight and when to play loose, at the right time. Wallace Sititi did an admirable job during the 2024 Test season as an interim blindside: his incessant work rate and energy allowed him to be (relatively) effective in both tight and loose situations, showing up all over the field while being a bruising physical presence. But Sititi is about as natural a number 8 as there is: he will carry relentlessly and put his team on the front foot, using both his considerable physical power as well as his skillset to break tackles and gain terrain. He seems destined to end up at the back of the AB scrum. So what are the options available to the coaches? What the AB selectors will be looking out for, I think, is a player who falls into one of the two aforementioned categories, but who shows genuine ability in playing the other style as well. And the player who has shown the most improvement in this sense, during the 2025 SR season, has been Simon Parker. Parker has always been a player of promise, a big body who moves well and shows solid technique in the tackle, carry and clean. But what he has shown this season is a new dimension on attack, a willingness to play a central role on attack. This moment late in the recent game against Moana Pasifika highlights Parker’s newfound confidence on attack, first throwing the wide pass before running the support line and throwing a beautiful offload for the Ratima try: Parker double involvement on attack To look at this development a bit more closely, the game against the Crusaders in Round 2 nicely encapsulates the growth of the Kaiwaka flanker’s game. In the first half, Parker was able to display his traditional strength, his work and physicality in the tight exchanges. Aggressive cleans, dominant tackles, multiple involvements on both attack and defence through the middle, typically in close cooperation with the tight five But what he has improved upon this season is his development of a genuine attacking game, running great lines, being creative in the wider channels and showing a deft array of passing. Number 8 skills from Parker: finding gaps and keeping the attack alive So someone like Parker will be of great interest to the AB selectors, as he fits the template of an AB blindside, currently. He is able to impact the game, no matter the type of encounter, due to his ability to be efficient in both the tight and the loose. The grunt of a lock and the soft skills of a number 8, this is, in the end, what they are looking for in a blindside flanker. For a final note on this already way too long collection of thoughts, it’s relevant to emphasize the importance of coaching in Parker’s development. The Chiefs have been clear about how they want to play during games, taking on the opposition pack in a direct tussle during the first half in order to tire them out, before playing a more expansive game in the second. Parker clearly knows his assignments during each half, making it easier to balance between tight and loose styles of play and to make decisions on attack and defence. Herein also lies a key directive for the AB coaches in their search for a new blindside: clarity around game plan and requirements eases the task of the blindside flanker, who already has to juggle different styles and roles across 80 minutes on the field. There are plenty of suitable candidates in NZ to be a quality number 6 at Test level: what is needed is a clear selection policy as well as a straightforward plan, which allows these varied skillsets to shine. Whether it be a tight or a loose blindside, or someone who is able to switch between the two, performance starts with the long-term planning and vision of the AB coaches. And looking at the state of the jersey for the past 7 years, it’s clear they have some work to do.

The chat seems to have firmly switched to 2026, so figured the new thread was in order. Below is the contract status of the current squad: Props: Ethan de Groot (2027) Daniel Lienert-Brown (Off-contract) Josh Bartlett (2026?) Saula Ma’u (2026?) Sefo Kautai (2026?) Rohan Wingham (2026?) Hookers: Jack Taylor (2026) Soane Vikena (2026) Henry Bell (Off-contract - am hearing he has had his contract extended for 2026) Locks: Fabian Holland (2028) Mitch Dunshea (Off-contract - rumour is he is staying) Tai Cribb (Injury Cover) Loose Forwards: Oliver Haig (2026) TK Howden (2026) Lui Naeta (GONE) Sean Withy (2027?) Veveni Lasaqa (2026) Hayden Michaels (2026) Michael Loft (Injury Cover) Tom Sanders (GONE) Hugh Renton (2026) Will Stodart (2026) Nikora Broughton (Off-contract?) Halfbacks: Folau Fakatava (2027) Nathan Hastie (2026 - LEAVING) James Arscott (GONE) Adam Lennox (Injury Cover - SIGNED) First Fives: Taine Robinson (2026?) Cam Millar (2026) Ajay Faleafaga (JAPAN) Midfielders: Timoci Tavatavanawai (2027) Tanielu Tele’a (2026?) Thomas Umaga-Jensen (2025/26?) Jake Te Hiwi (2026) Josh Whaanga (2027) Outside Backs: Jacob Ratumaitavuki-Kneepkens (2028) Sam Gilbert (CONNACHT) Finn Hurley (2026) Jona Nareki (Off-contract) Caleb Tangitau (2028) Jonah Lowe (Off-contract) Michael Manson (Off-contract) Taniela Filimone (Injury Cover)

The season is over and the results are posted The champion for the season is yet again winning his 4th consecutive Super tipping title and 7th title in all. And winning like a champion, picking every result with margin in the final week to score a massive 70 points. He pipped by 4 points, the Crusaders victory being the decisive moment as they had identical points from for Saturday. 3rd was who was punished for picking closer victories on Saturday. Rounding out the top 10 were in 4th, Langakali & shared 5th, in 7th, in 8th, I finished 9th and & shared 10th. Best weekend score was 72 for both TR and Victor, a season's best in the final week. Chris picked the most results correctly, 57 out of 76 and Hydro11 picked most margins by quite a distance, 28 maximums during the season. The new champions with their first title since 2019 were the SunJags - well done to Richie, Boof and occasionally who didn't turn up for the final. It was a comfortable win over South Island by 46 to 37, with 63 the key and well supported by with 49. No score higher than 44 for South Island but a good season for them overall. Taking a spot on the podium were Blues A, thrashing BOP Chiefs who fell apart at the business end of the season. TR and powered the victory for Blues A. The remaining placings were 5th Barbarians 6th Hurricanes Black 7th Hurricanes Gold 8th Blues B Thanks to everyone who stuck with it all season, especially those that were out of contention. See you all at the end of July for NPC Tipping.

Well, well the (UK, at least) season ends and here we are again. Not a vintage season by any stretch with the title decided early on and, more worringly for the game as a whole, the relegations also. Let's wrap things up before doing some awards. Liverpool: Huge season, won it at a canter with consistent football with huge, big game players up the front and back. Massive shout outs to Arno Slot for doing the virtually impossible (following on from Klopp), you have to take your hat off to them. Well played Arsenal: What could have been. A great team with a glaringly obvious issue that I'll cover later on. End the season with a dusty trophy cabinet which for me can be placed firmly on Arteta's shoulders for not plugging an obvious gap. 2nd in EPL and SF for CL is pretty damn good, but oh what could have been ... City: 3 seasons in one season. Picked up where they left off, fell apart, then came back to end 3rd. In my view, I thought the squad looked a bit bored and happy to just pick up their salary week to week. Trophyless and often, hunger less. You don't say that about Guardiola's teams often, if ever. Chelsea: Still a one man team honestly, and the form of the one man dictated their season. Ended with some silverware (Europe Conference League) and a young exciting squad. A real launchpad for 25/26. Dare I be excited about my team? Newcastle: Brilliant season, but I do feel that this years results might be the peak of the current setup. EPL Trophy and fourth is nothing to be sniffed at and I'm genuinely happy for their fans. But if their aspirations are higher, a big shift change may be required. Especially if they can't hang on to Isak. Aston Villa: Oh Villa, so close but oh so far. It all looked good for so long, but perhaps like Newcastle this is their peak. Emery has done a great job and if not for the last days result, a huge pass mark for the season. But not to be. No CL next year, huge disappointment for them. Nottingham Forest; Wow, I did not see that coming (which means nothing really). Great team to watch, pure heart with a classic old school striker up front doing old school striker things. Became a lot of peoples default second team this year, where to for 25/26? Nuno seems pretty solid at the helm, so I think they'll be upper mid again next year. Brighton: Another solid season for this club, I do think that other clubs should look at their managerial recruitment. They've done really well here. I didn't get much time to watch these guys sadly, but from all readings a decent enough competitive season Bournemouth: Really good season for these guys, I think beating almost all expectations. Brentford: I almost feel like they have cemented themselves in the EPL this year, I thought their time might be done, but they've performed admirably. Like the two above, I didn't see many of their games unfortunately, so little to comment Fulham: Disappointing for them the league position, I honestly thought they deserved higher than this. Played well and Fulham away a tough proposition. Palace: Who gives a shit about the league they won the FA cup! Everton: A decent result in the end. Moyes return not exactly the most welcomed, or perhaps the most inspired, but he's given them the Moyes consistency and they'll be much better for it next year in their new stadium. West Ham: Tough to know what to think, as 43 points is not a bad return for them, although I think they could have done better. Have a good solid squad and able to grind out a result if needed. Fickle as anything fans though. Man United. Where to begin. Shambles, shocking, shoddy... shit. Amorim seems to really have the backing, but I've no idea why. ETH got the boot, deservedly, and Amorim was left to try and make the squad work. But he couldn't. They've got some off season work to do, big time. But with no Europe, how can they attract the big players. I'd be looking at that academy if I were you Amorim. Spurs: Does one swallow make a summer? Perhaps it does with the Europe league win, but what a shambles of a league. Ange will surely go, as Spurs have no idea how to defend on a week to week basis. The right manager and this squad can go places. Bottom 3: I'm going to comment on them as a group, as reality is that they weren't up to the level. Is it their fault, well I don't know, but the numbers are stark. The 3 promoted teams all went down, with a shocking 13 point gap up to 17th. This is real warning signs for the league and it must be noted. The gap can't continue to be this big between the leagues, and the emperors must take note and look to address it otherwise the whole system is well and truly kaput. And now, time for the awards ..... The Nostridumbarse Award For Awful Predictions. An open field, but a runaway leader in . Still reeling after possibly the worst call of 23/24 (Rice will not be worth anything like his Arsenal transfer fee), here are this schmucks predictions: *City, Arsenal, Villa, United, Spurs, Chelsea, Newcastle, Liverpool ...... Ipswich, Brentford, Southampton. Basically I think Villa are going to keep going, United to bounce a bit, Liverpool to struggle with an aging squad and a post-Fergie style post-Klopp. Chelsea will still be dogshit, but beat the lesser teams. Brentford golden run feels like it's done for me & as for mid-table, I have absolutely no idea.* He got Arsenal right & 2 out of the 3 relegates, but overall a terrible misread of the season. Don't listen to this clown, he knows nothing. The What Did You Eat For Xmas Lunch Award Cole Palmer. It's not untrue to say in that in the first half of the season he was the best player in the league, and honestly speaking, perhaps the planet. The global talk of Palmer was huge and week in, week out, he backed it up. Nobody cared about his shocking haircut, rather unusual looks and personality of a sodden brick wall, he had it all. Goals, assists and opposition were scared of him. And then, it just stopped. The goals dried up, the confidence dropped and the whole team lost their way. From 1 point of the top to dropping 15 points and ending their title run in January. Amazing. The Were You Aware Of This Award League, League Cup, FA Cup, Euro League, Euro Conference League. All won by different EPL clubs. Thought that was a pretty cool stat! Kiwi Of The Year Chris Wood. It's an NZ based site, you can't expect me to not give him an award. The Are You Aware You Can Buy a Striker Award Mikel Arteta. Arsenal were so damn good this year in so many facets of play. Really good to watch with some young players and a Captain with a bit of Roy Keane demeanour. Yet, without a 20 goal a year striker, they sadly looked destined to end the season as they did. Decent set of results, but an empty trophy cabinet. As I type, they are in the midst of signing a new midfielder. .... Wake up Mikel! Personality Of The Year Cole Palmer. Yeah right, obviously not. Last year I gave my man of the year to Ange based on his personality, but this year it can only go to the Japanese Ambassador. Ok, this has little to do with football, but was I the only one who found the media part of the EPL this season a bit dull? Did anybody light things up with their charisma, charm or absurd arrogance? I honestly can't think of anyone. Manager Of The Year Nuno! Forest had a superb season and even as a one eyed Kiwi, you have to look past Chris Wood's heroics & acknowledge that it's down to Nuno. Poor ending but they really lit up the EPL this year. Bit rough on Arno Slot who had the tough job of following on from Klopp, but he did inherit a great squad, so I can't give it to him. Player Of The Year Look, I don't like Liverpool, I get bored of every second person I meet in my demographic having their own bullshit reasons for loving this team (success in the 80's is the true answer you bunch of liars), but Mo Salah this year was out of this world. There are two types of people in the world. Those that give the 24/25 EPL POTY to Salah, and liars. It was daylight in the end, and as he approaches the twilight of his career, he's better than ever. The Big One. The MajorRage Overall Award This year, it goes to ......... Fans of Palace & Newcastle. Your teams lit up the cups winning their first trophies since forever & I know of not one single person who begrudges you, the fans, of these trophies. There will always be misgivings about funding etc, but thats not your fault. I know a smattering of fans from each club and you were all, to a man, humble, emotional and hugely proud of your clubs for their respective cups. In a league full of tribal support often based on negative emotions, I found your celebrations truly joyous. Next Season If you think I'm going to comment on that, you've not been paying attention. Stick to for this one.

pretty average game for all the hype this year. NSW were really fucking good in the first half, their forwards rolled the fuck over us from teh first set, their halves kicked us to death, and their kick chase and linespeed was far superior. Qld for whatever reason left all teh carrying to their backs and Carrigan. And then the NSW backs were a class above. Crichton is a fucking beast, big, fast, skillful, and defensively really strong. When To'o was in the bin he defended that edge by himself. If Cleary wasn't a rep level choker they would have been a mile in front at half time. The 2nd half was just shit. Qld dragged NSW down to their level and both teams pretty much sucked. Even the tries scored were scrappy as hell. Alarm bells in camp Qld. The forwards got fucking smashed, and i am not sure there is anyone out there to come in to change it. Cotter was anonumous on an edge. Tried hard but couldn't make an impact. Tino didn't do enough. Fotuaika did nothing. Carrigan ran ok, and Nanai had his best ever Origin, but other than a couple of solid Nanai shots, they were smashed. The spine is a huge worry. Grant had a stinker. DCE tried but faded away and created fuck all. Munster the same. Ponga offered nothing. And they weren't connected at all. In the backs the newbie looked right at home, Coates played ok. Val Holmes fucking sucked and brought his Dragons form, while Hammer created one opportunity all night, and it was wasted because Holmes was asleep. No impact from the bench except for Deardon who absolutely has to start. Collins is cooked. If Billy pulls this "Qld Spirit" bullshit and rolls out an unchanged team then the series is over before we get to Sydney. And make no mistake, he's under real pressure. Slater is a Suailii high shot from 4 straight losses and staring down the barrel of a 2nd straight clean sweep. Last year the couldn't score a try unless NSW were down to 12 (they didn't score a try in the decider) and it was the same last night. The attack is toothless and never looked like troubling the NSW linespeed last night. And the defence is pretty average. When the talent pool is this shallow, you need to coach better.

After trying to deduce what the intended defensive shape of the NZ U20s side was in a previous post, here I want to highlight some of the issues experienced by the Baby Blacks during the U20 TRC and what we can reasonably expect from them moving forwards. The issues Before looking more concretely into the several ‘improvement areas’ of the Baby Blacks’ defensive effort, we can take a look at a chart of the opposition scores. How did they come about, where did they originate? An area for immediate improvement becomes apparent when seeing that the NZ U20s conceded 4 maul tries and 3 rather cheap tries off of turnovers: Kunawave’s volleyball spike towards his own try line against the Junior Wallabies, Harvey’s reckless offload in his own 22 against the Pumitas, and Woodley’s backdoor pass which was intercepted by Mlaba in the game against the Junior Boks. A more sturdy maul defence – the openside pillar of the defensive maul was exposed several times, allowing the attacking maul to sheer all too easily towards that space – and better decision-making in the 22 should, at the very least, make the defensive numbers a bit more respectable. But there are also some more structural issues, both inherent within the chosen defensive system and ingrained within particular playing habits, which might be more difficult to fix at short notice. These particular things stood out to me. (1) Learning the system As mentioned above, the defensive shape chosen by the Baby Blacks – narrow defensive line, double tackles, defensive shooters – is not an easy one and requires both a lot of communication as well as defensive nous. The defensive shooter on the wing, for example, can be tasked with shutting down a massive overlap. At several points during the tournament, the outside backs did what was asked of them by shooting up but, once they were in the right space, didn’t really know how to effectively kill the opposition backline movement. This happened multiple times, for example, in the game against the Junior Wallabies: In the first instance, Solomon shoots up to kill a two-man overlap but there’s zero pressure on the player with the ball in his hands (Fowler), making it easy for the latter to just throw the long ball over Solomon’s head for the easy walk-in try to Harvey. The second example shows much of the same. Kunawave shoots up but, again, there’s no pressure on either the player with the ball in his hands (notice the clever blocking play by Eli Langi) or on the targets for the pass, Kunawave running past them rather than stay with the play. It’s important to say, however, that this isn’t easy at all. Singlehandedly stopping an overlap requires a lot of defensive know-how, which isn’t something that can really be expected of players like Solomon and Kunawave, who are most likely unfamiliar with the such requirements. Both examples show that having defensive shooters to ‘spook’ the attack is a collective endeavour: the time and space of the ball carrier needs to be cut down, just as much as the space for the potential receivers needs to be. If a defensive shooter operates alone, there’s very little chance for them to actually be effective. Everyone in the defence needs to be on the same page, if the defensive pressure game is to actually be implemented. This is quite an aggressive and complex system to employ, so it will take time to properly embed within the team. It should get better by the time of the World Championship but it’s still a risky system, meant to pressure opposition decision-making while leaving a lot of space available for the opposition attack. Learning the ins and outs of the system is tantamount to becoming a serious defensive outfit. (2) Lack of numbers and weak edge defence A second issue is closely related to the first and can partly be explained as a systems issue and as something which the players probably still need to get used to. A side effect of the narrow defence and the focus on dominating the collision around the middle areas of the field is that the NZ U20 defence can easily be outflanked. The Baby Blacks do not want to concede the gain-line through their centre so they concentrate their forwards in the middle, trying to put multiple numbers into the collision while wrapping up the opposition carrier, slowing down their ball and trying to turn the contact into an arm wrestle. Against the Junior Boks, for example, with the NZ U20s defending inside their own 22, the forwards are all concentrated close to each other, looking to stop the Junior Boks from going through them. First Johnston and Bason, then Woodley, Pole and Treacy, bringing down the Junior Bok forwards in double tackles while looking to wrap up the ball in contact. The issue is, however, that the numbers of the stronger defenders quickly run out and with a few more carries one off the ruck from the Junior Boks, Mlaba, the Junior Bok number eight, is suddenly only faced with Cole (10), Wiseman (12) and Kunawave (14) as his opposite defenders. No points for guessing how that ends. One of the reasons why the Baby Blacks struggle with numbering up in defence is the double role given to the 9 to perform within this system. Within this passage of play, we see Sinton organizing the defence behind the ruck at the start of the movement. Sinton, behind the ruck, scanning the opposition attack and directing numbers But the 9 is also responsible for defending the edge against backline strikes. So when the Junior Bok backs start moving into position and Moyo starts getting involved in organizing the attack, Sinton disappears out wide to shore up the outside defence in anticipation of a midfield strike. At that moment, however, the defensive organisation starts to suffer as well, as there is no one to direct the defensive numbers or point out weaknesses in the defensive line. As a result, mismatches are easily manipulated by the Junior Bok attack, positioning loose forwards to carry against smaller backs. It was a similar story for the first Junior Wallaby try, with Pledger first acting as defensive organizer and sweeper behind the defensive ruck: Before quickly moving to the edge when the Aussie backline started shaping up for a strike. Pledger spots a Junior Wallaby backline shape and swiftly starts moving to the wing This is a bit of a bug in the system, as this dual responsibility of the 9 can be exploited by the opposition attack: if they wanted to manipulate the defensive numbers, they can shape their backline for a strike (removing the defensive organizer), while their real intention is to first make the defensive line overfold to the blindside before attacking the open. The NZ U20 forwards, who are mainly concerned with dominating the collision, aren’t paying much attention to numbers, swarming into the contact area. But this makes them susceptible, as we’ve seen throughout the tournament, of losing sight of the bigger picture. (3) Defensive connection As I’ve mentioned above, in a defensive system which is built on attempting to establish dominance in the collision area, connection and communication are absolutely key. And it is in this aspect where I think the most improvement can and will need to be found, if the NZ U20s are to take the next step in their defensive development. There were at least three zones of recurring disconnection, in my view: (a) during the defensive chase, (b) during opposition lineout attack, between the back of the lineout defender and the first defender, and (c) between the pillar defenders at the breakdown and the first defender outside the ruck. While the first issues mentioned above were mainly systems issues, defensive disconnection doesn’t really fall under that, as the first principle of any defence is to connect properly with both your inside and outside man. (3a) The defensive chase A first form of disconnect which often recurred could be found during different kinds of defensive chases, such as from from kick return or from broken play. It’s clear that players are instructed to quickly close down opposition space, and kick returns and loose balls are ideal opportunities for defensive shooters to tackle opposition players far behind the gain line. But again though, the key is to remain connected to your teammates. A good example of how over-eagerness can lead to poor outcomes can be found with the first Junior Wallaby score, a try to Liam Grover early in the game. With the Junior Wallabies hot on attack inside the NZ U20s 22 after some poor discipline, a pass from Hwi Sharples doesn’t find its mark and bounces off of Beau Morrisson, the AU U20 number eight, onto the ground. This is the situation of the defensive line right before the ball becomes loose for the Junior Wallabies: Seeing the ball hit the floor, Kunawave immediately sprints out of the defensive line to pressure the receiver. While the intention is the right one, there is zero communication with his outsides, as this is the situation just a second or two later. Grover, the Junior Wallaby 13, has recovered the ball while Kunawave has over-chased. Simpson, meanwhile has drifted towards the side line while Letiu is still following more than a few metres behind. Where nothing was happening for the Junior Wallaby attack just a second ago, the NZ U20 line has opened like the Red Sea, as a result from an individual defensive chase. The effects of a poorly coordinated chase Similar examples can be found during opposition kick return, where the NZ U20 chase was aggressive but where the support following in behind was uncoordinated, leading to simple outside breaks for the opposition attack. Again, Kunawave chases aggressively but Roberts bites in without any cover on the edge, providing the Pumitas with a potentially dangerous break outside of their own 22. (3b) The lineout seam Another area of poor connection could be found during opposition lineout attack, where the seam between the tail defender at the back of the lineout (the NZ hooker) and the first defender off the lineout (blindside winger) could be successfully exploited. The Baby Blacks used their wingers as first defenders in the backline, with Kunawave and Saunoa tasked to stop hard running ball carriers off first phase in the first game against the Junior Wallabies. In their first attacking lineout near the NZ U20s 22, the Junior Wallabies would throw to the back. Their goal was to attack the seam between the NZ hooker and blindside winger, looking for a half-break to set up the attack, after which they can run at a fragmented defensive line. Morrisson makes sure to draw Letiu before releasing the ball to Veiru on the unders line They would have continued success with this move throughout the first half, exploiting the amount of space behind the lineout formation as well as the inability of Letiu and his wingers to effectively defend this space. While this isn’t a particularly easy area to defend, Letiu and his wingers presented a fragile defensive connection as well, neither seemingly on the same page of when and where to defend these incursions. Kunawave and Saunoa were either slow to react or unable to physically make a dominant hit, allowing the Australian U20s easy momentum for set-piece attack. Letiu was also too easily drawn in to the fake maul, drawing him away from this seam and further making the lineout seam vulnerable. Part of the issue here is again system-based, the fact that, within the Baby Blacks’ defensive structure, certain backs like Kunawave are asked to do both a lot of defensive work as well as perform different kinds of defensive interventions. There seems to be a relatively clear distribution of attacking and defensive roles – for example, Solomon is one of the key decision-makers in attack while someone like Cooper Roberts seems like the defensive leader – but a utility player like Kunawave is seemingly used like a Swiss army knife. But even then, there’s limits to how much utility value a single player can bring. Realigning some of the defensive responsibilities across the backline might bring more effectiveness in this regard. (3c) Disconnection between the pillar defence and first defenders outside Every defensive system is going to have its own flaws – for example, the benefit of an extra defender in the line vs. the downside of not having a defensive scanner, as mentioned above – and that comes down to certain preferences and tactical decisions from the coaching group. There’s not a whole lot that can be done about this. What can be changed, however, is certain individual inaccuracies, i.e. simple bad defensive execution. While the porousness of the defensive line throughout the U20 TRC can be partly explained by the issues with the multiple defensive roles played by the 9, at the same time, players need to do better to communicate and organize the distance between themselves within the defensive line. Take the following example from the game against the Junior Wallabies. There’s over 3 metres of space between Bason and Aio Keith, while Bason is slow in closing the space down between himself and the Aussie first five, Fowler. The latter spots the disconnection – too much space between Bason and Keith, Baker is ahead of Bason despite being the secondary defender – and easily exploits this by stepping back inside and attacking the fragile seam between Bason and Baker. Baker does well to cling onto Fowler to stop the full linebreak Ironically perhaps, this defensive organization improved as the tournament went on, despite conceding 45 points in their final game. The fact that the Junior Boks scored three of their seven tries from 5+ phases shows that they needed to work harder for their scores, at a pace their attack couldn’t sustain for the whole 80. After the early onslaught in the first 30 minutes, the Junior Boks were only able to construct one more score in open play, their other points coming from a maul penalty try and a rather fortuitous if well-executed turnover try. Someone like Mosese Bason exemplified this improved defensive effort: after a poor defensive performance against the Junior Wallabies – falling off several standard tackles through poor positioning, footwork and tackle technique – Bason turned in a much more effective performance against the Junior Boks, showing more urgency, accuracy and physicality in defence. Prospects for the U20 World Championships As the tournament went on, certain improvements were noticeable. As can be expected, the defensive disconnection – which was especially rampant against the Junior Wallabies – became less omnipresent. Also, as players became more accustomed to the system requirements of the NZ U20 defence, system failures became less common, the outside backs more astute in when and where to shoot up, as well as support players becoming more aware of their own tasks during these moments. All that being said, it is hard to imagine this side suddenly becoming a defensive powerhouse. There is more than enough will amongst the players – it’s clear there’s no issue with work rate or commitment – but I’m not sure an extra month will be enough time to fix certain tendencies in terms of tackle technique and defensive positioning. The return of players like Oli Mathis, Jayden Sa and Frank Vaenuku – all players with excellent tackle technique, by the way – should definitely help, although the players they’ll most likely replace in the starting lineup – Woodley, Treacy/McLeod and Saunoa – weren’t necessarily the problem to begin with. Perhaps the inclusion of someone like Logan Wallace might make the biggest impact in this regard, as a prop who excels with his work rate around the field. If he can provide a stabile platform in the scrum, then the team as a whole should improve (that's still a big if). But again, the strength of this team lies in its ability to accumulate scores in quick succession. If the Baby Blacks can get their defensive connection and communication right, to make the opposition at least work hard for their scores and tire them out, then they should have a reasonable chance at the World Championships in Italy.

We still have big problems with our loosies, and most of our issues last year centered around our loosies being outplayed consistently, affecting the quality of ball we got. We have two blokes who are supremely talented - Ardie and Sititi - but can you afford to play both? We don't have a Kaino to pair them with, and outside of Finau or a complete rookie, we end up with an undersized trio. After snubbing Akira, all our eggs were in the Finau basket but he needs more time (as expected). I actually think the best use of Ardie and Sititi is probably a one-two punch at 8, Ardie for the first 50 Sititi for the last 30. I have pretty big concerns with playing Ardie at 7, defensively I think we will lose too much compared to the likes of Cane and this year Dalton who smack blokes around the entire 80 minutes. Can include Blackadder in that as well, who has a similar workrate though with less impact. I actually don't know who I would pick. On paper Finau-Dalton-Savea with Sititi on the bench looks the most balanced. But then we are limiting Sititi's minutes who seems made for test rugby, and once again hoping Finau can make the step up. I think this is our biggest problem to solve this year.